

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULLTEXTLESLI GELB BYLINER HEADED U.S.  
URGES NEW ARMS-TALK APPROACH, PAGE 3, NYTIMES MARCH 3, 1974
2. WASHINGTON MARCH 2 - THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED  
TO THE SOVIET UNION A NEW NEGOTIATING APPROACH ON STRATEGIC  
ARMS THAT WOULD SEEK TO ESTABLISH BROAD "WORKING PRINCIPLES"  
AND AT FIRST AVOID DETAILS AND SPECIFIC NUMBERS, ACCORDING  
TO THE DIPLOMATS AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS.
3. SUCH AN APPROACH, IT IS HOPED WOULD ALLOW MOVEMENT  
TOWARD AN AGREEMENT BEFORE PRESIDENT NIXON'S SCHEDULED  
TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SUMMER. THE PRESENT PHASE  
OF THE AMERICAN-SOVIET TALKS, BEING HELD IN GENEVA WITH THE  
AIM OF PRODUCING A PERMANENT ACCORD ON LIMITING OFFENSIVE  
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN AT A STANDSTILL FOR  
SOME TIME.

4. ACCORDING TO THE INFORMANTS, THE UNITED STATES IS

PROPOSING TWO SEPARATE FORMULAS TO BRING ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL EQUALITY BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN NUCLEAR FORCES.

5. THE UNITED STATES CURRENTLY HAS A LEAD IN OVER-ALL TECHNOLOGY AND NUMBERS OF WARHEADS, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION, HAS AN ADVANTAGE IN LAND-BASED MISSILE PAYLOADS- THE AMOUNT THAT CAN BE HURLED AT THE OPPOSING SIDE.

#### SPECIAL BASES FOR EQUALITY

6. THE FIRST FORMULA, THE INFORMANTS SAID, WOULD SEEK A SPECIAL SYSTEM OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY. THIS WOULD BE DESIGNED TO BALANCE THE TOTAL OF AMERICAN LAND-BASED MISSILES, SUBMARINE - LAUNCH MISSILES AND LONG-RANGE BOMBERS WITH THE SAME SOVIET TOTAL.

7. UNDER THE FORMULA, EACH SIDE COULD DETERMINE ITS OWN MIX OF THE THREE FORCES. THUS THE UNITED STATES COULD BUILD MORE SUBMARINES AND PHASE DOWN ITS LAND-BASED FORCES AND BOMBERS, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION COULD KEEP ITS STRENGTH IN LAND FORCES AND DE-EMPHASIZE OTHER WEAPONS.

8. THE SECOND FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE INFORMANTS SAID, WOULD AIM AT ACHIEVING EQUALITY IN THE PAY-LOAD OF LAND-BASED MISSILES.

9. THIS FORMULA IS SAID TO BE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING TOTAL STOCKS OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS THROUGH LIMITING NOT THE WARHEADS THEMSELVES BUT THE NUMBER OF MISSILES ON WHICH THE WARHEADS MIGHT BE FITTED OR THE AMOUNT OF EACH MISSILE'S PAYLOAD.

10. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES, THE SOURCES SAID, THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE PRINCIPLES IN THE GENEVA TALKS WOULD ALLOW EACH SIDE TO RETURN HOME AND TRY TO WORK OUT FURTHER COMPROMISES WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENT SO THAT EACH SIDE COULD BE IN A POSITION TO PRESENT UNCLASSIFIED

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OR DISCUSS A DETAILED DRAFT TREATY.

11. ACCORDING TO A DIPLOMATIC SOURCE, SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON THREE WEEKS AGO THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE THIS "WORKING PRINCIPLES" APPROACH. THE SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS SAID TO HAVE ACQUIESCED, BUT NOT EAGERLY, .

#### ALTERATION IN APPROACH

12. STARTING FROM WORKING PRINCIPLES REPRESENTS A SHIFT IN APPROACH ON BOTH SIDES. THE RUSSIANS PREFER DETAILED PROPOSALS, THE SOURCES SAID.

13. WHEN THE CURRENT ROUND OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, THE SECOND, BEGAN ON NOV. 21, 1972, THE UNITED STATES QUICKLY PRESENTED DETAILED PROPOSALS AND THE SOVIET UNION SET FORTH A DRAFT TREATY SHORTLY THEREAFTER. A NUMBER OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE DESCRIBED THOSE POSITIONS AS "VERY FAR APART ON ALL COUNTS."

14. AT A STANDSTILL, THE PARTIES AGREED TO RECESS LAST NOVEMBER, WENT BACK TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND RESUMED THE TALKS ON FEB 19.

15. THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND ROUND FOLLOWED AGREEMENTS IN THE FIRST ROUND IN MAY, 1972-ATREATY LIMITING DEFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS AND AN INTERIM FIVE-YEAR ACCORD ON LIMITING SOME OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

16. THE PURPOSE OF THE SECOND ROUND IS TO MAKE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT INTO A PERMANENT ONE AND TO INCLUDE OTHER NUCLEAR ARMS AND PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION.

17. THE INTERIM ACCORD ALLOWED THE UNITED STATES 1,000 LANDBASED MISSILES AND 710 SEA-LAUNCHED MISSILES; THE SOVIET UNION IS PERMITTED 1,410 LAND-BASED MISSILES IF IT BUILDS UP TO 950 SEA-LAUNCHED MISSILES. STRATEGIC BOMBERS, OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS 448-THE SOVIET FIGURE IS PUT AT 130-WERE NOT INCLUDED.

NO LIMIT ON MIRV'S  
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18. NEITHER DID THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT PLACE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON MULTIPLE WARHEADS THAT CAN BE AIMED AT SEPARATE TARGETS, KNOWN TECHNICALLY AS MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND POPULARLY AS MIRV'S. WHEN WASHINGTON COMPLETES ITS MIRV PROGRAM IN 1977, IT EXPECTS TO HAVE OVER 10,000 SEPARATELY TARGETABLE WARHEADS. MOSCOW BEGAN TESTING MIRV'S LAST AUGUST.

19. THE CURRENT AMERICAN PROPOSAL CALLS FOR CONTROLS ON -QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS" OR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION, BUT IT REPORTEDLY DOES NOT REFER TO (REST OF PARAGRAPH NOT PRINTED)

20. FURTHERMORE, THE PROPOSAL IS SAID TO IGNORE THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN AND AROUND EUROPE THAT CAN REACH SOVIET TERRITORY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT THOSE WEAPONS, KNOWN AS FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT.

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21. DIPLOMATS AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAY THE UNITED STATES IS NOW TRYING TO COPE WITH THIS OBJECTION BY DANG-LING THE PROSPECT OF INCLUDING THE FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS IN THE SCOPE OF THE EAST-WEST TALKS BEING HELD IN VIENNA ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS WAY, THE INFORMANTS SAID, FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS COULD BE REDUCED AS THE SOVIET UNION DESIRES, BUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMERICAN WISHES, NOT BE TREATED AS STRATEGIC ARMS.

22. ACCORDING TO THE INFORMANTS, THE WORKING-PRINCIPLES APPROACH BEING TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES ALLOWS CERTAIN CONTINUING DISPUTES IN THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY-THE MILITARY SERVICES, THE CIVILIANS IN THE PENTAGON, STATE DEPARTMENT GROUPS AND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY-TO BE BY-PASSED IN ANY MOVES TOWARD IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

23. DESPITE THE AMERICAN LEAD IN TECHNOLOGY AND NUMBERS  
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OF WARHEADS, WASHINGTON HAS BEEN WORRIED ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION,S SIZABLE AND GROWING ADVANTAGE IN LAND-BASED MISSILE PAYLOAD AND A PROSPECT THAT IT COULD SOON CATCH UP IN MIRV'S.

24. THE SPECIFIC CONCERN, SHARED THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, IS THAT MOSCOW MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO USE THIS PAYLOAD EDGE TO WIPE OUT MOST OF THE AMERICAN MINUTEMAN MISSILE FORCE. THIS, THE OFFICIALS REASONED, WOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES WITH NO OPTION BUT TO RETALIATE AGAINST SOVIET CITIES, THEREBY INVITING COUNTER-ATTACK AGAINST AMERICAN CITIES.

25. IN CONSIDERING HOW TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, THE OFFICIALS OF THE AMERICAN ARMS BUREAUCRACY WERE ABLE TO SETTLE ON AN OVERALL BARGAINING APPROACH-CONTINUING WITH NEW NUCLEAR-ARMS PROGRAMS AND RESEARCH AS BARGAINING CHIPS TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM MOSCOW - BU THEY APPARENTLY COULD SETTLE ON LITTLE ELSE.

26. THE MILITARY POSITION WAS THAT MISSILE HAD TO BE TREATED SEPARATELY FROM BOMBERS, THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BUILD UP LAND-BASED MISSILES TO EQUAL THE SOVIET NUMBERS AND PAYLOAD, AND THAT MIRV'S SHOULD NOT BE CONTROL LED.

27. MR. KISSINGER WAS SAID TO HAVE ARGUED FOR TREATING BOMBERS AND MISSILES TOGETHER, FOR PROPOSING OVER-ALL MUTUAL REDUCTIONS AND FOR CONTROLS ON MULTIPLY TARGETABLE WEAPONS.

28. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SOME OFFICIALS SAID, DID NOT TAKE A POSITION WHETHER BOMBERS AND MISSILES WOULD BE CALCULATED TOGETHER, WAS OPPOSED TO A FORCE BUILD-UP AND DID NOT FEEL THAT MIRV'S COULD BE CONTROLLED. HE WAS SAID TO HAVE WANTED TO LIMIT PAYLOADS RATHER THAN SEEK CONTROLS. IF THESE ACCOUNTS ARE CORRECT, THE WORKING PRINCIPLES APPEAR TO BE A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER VIEWS. BUT THE MILITARY AND OTHERS HAVE NOT LOST, SINCE NO NUMBERS ARE INCLUDED IN THE WORKING PRINCIPLES AND SINCE UNCLASSIFIED

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MIRV,S ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY DEALT WITH.

29. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR OVER-ALL EQUALITY IN MISSILES AND BOMBERS, THE WORKING PRINCIPLES REPORTEDLY DO NOT SPECIFY WHETHER THE AMERICAN TOTALS ARE TO BE BUILT UP TO SOVIET TOTALS OR THE REVERSE, OR WHETHER BOTH ARE TO BE REDUCED TO SOME EVEN LOWER COMMON LEVEL. AS OF NOW THE SOVIET TOTAL IN MISSILES AND BOMBERS IS PUT AT 2,490 AND THE AMERICAN TOTAL IS 2,158.

30. THE OTHER FEATURE OF THE FIRST FORMULS - THE FREE-DOM BOTH SIDES WOULD RETAIN TO DECIDE HOW MANY LAND, SEA AND BOMBER FORCES TO HAVE WITHIN THE OVER-ALL COMMON TOTAL-REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT VICTORY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ARGUING THE NEED TO PHASE OUT LAND-BASED MISSILES. MANY AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE LONG INSISTED THAT THE MINUTEMAN IS ESSENTIALLY VULNERABLE AND THAT THERE IS NEED TO MOVE TOWARD LESS VULNERABLE SEA-BASED MISSILES.

31. THE SECOND FORMULA, AIMED AT ERASING THE VAST SOVIET PAYLOAD ADVANTAGE IN LAND-BASED MISSILES, WOULD , THE SOURCES SAID, MINIMIZE THE RUSSIANS' ABILITY TO LAUNCH A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STRIKE AGAINST THE MINUTEMAN FORCES. THE FORMULA WOULD COMPEL MOSCOW EITHER TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF LAND-BASED MISSILES OR TO REDUCE THE PAYLOAD OF EACH MISSILE.

32. THE SECOND FORMULA REPRESENTS A VICTORY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ARGUING THAT RESTRICTIONS ON PAYLOAD ARE A BETTER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE MINUTEMAN THAN CONTROLS ON MIRV'S. (END TEXT) DONALDSON

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